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ABSTRACT. The paper investigates the effects of agglomeration and 
specialization of technological activities on regional productivity growth, 
applying the notion of pecuniary knowledge externalities. The latter are indirect 
interdependencies between firms mediated by the price system. Pecuniary 
knowledge externalities enable to appreciate both the positive and negative 
effects associated with the regional concentration of knowledge generating 
activities. Our analysis leads to specify the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the agglomeration of innovation activities and 
productivity growth. The empirical investigation, based upon 138 European 
regions in the years 1996 through 2003, supports the hypothesis that 
agglomeration yields diminishing positive net effects beyond a maximum. The 
homogeneity of knowledge generating activities however reduces absorption 
costs and hence rises the net benefits at each agglomeration level. 
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1  Introduction 
 
This paper elaborates the hypothesis that the agglomeration of knowledge 
generating activities yields both positive and negative effects. It identifies both 
the positive externalities that emerge within regional clusters in terms of easier 
access to technological knowledge spilling in the local atmosphere, and the 
negative factors associated to higher absorption and congestion costs. The 
notion of pecuniary knowledge externalities enables the assessment of their 
combined effects in terms of a quadratic relationship between the regional 
concentration of knowledge generating activities and the net benefits from 
knowledge externalities. In order to test this hypothesis we investigate the 
relationship between agglomeration of technological activities and the growth 
of total factor productivity (TFP) for 138 European regions, observed in the time 
span ranging from 1995 to 2003. We find evidence of an inverted U-shaped 
relation between technological agglomeration and productivity growth, in 
particular with respect to the net positive effects of MAR externalities on 
productivity growth, rather than Jacobs’ externalities. More precisely, regions 
that are specialized in homogeneous technological fields benefit from 
agglomeration of knowledge generating activities activity to a greater extent 
than regions where the pattern of specialization is less homogeneous and more 
diversified. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the 
hypothesis and provides its foundations. Section 3 articulates the methodology 
adopted to measure TFP following the growth accounting approach, presents   3
the data set used for the empirical analysis and exhibits the econometric results 
of our study. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2  Pecuniary knowledge externalities 
 
For quite a long time the notion of technological externalities, as distinct from 
pecuniary externalities, has been applied successfully to investigate the effects 
of the spatial concentration of knowledge generating activities on productivity 
growth and regional development. It emphasizes the idea that firms clustering 
in geographic spaces benefit from external economies and knowledge spillovers 
in particular, and grow faster than isolated firms. The implicit assumption 
underlying this approach is that technological knowledge spills freely in the 
atmosphere and firms can take advantage of it at no costs. 
 
This literature, initiated by the path-breaking contributions of Zvi Griliches 
(1979 and 1992) and Adam Jaffe (1986) on the positive effects of proximity in 
knowledge space, focuses and elaborates on the advantages exerted by 
technological externalities on productivity growth of firms co-localized in the 
same geographical space. Here, within the received Marshallian tradition 
(Meade, 1952; Viner, 1932), technological externalities are qualified as 
‘untraded’ interdependencies among firms. These interdependencies are not 
mediated by the price mechanism and do not bear any actual costs for the firms 
to exploit their gains. 
   4
According to the terminology introduced by Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and 
Shleifer (1992) in their seminal paper, the advantages of agglomeration stem 
from three types of knowledge externalities: the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) 
externalities, which derive from the concentration of firms within a single 
industry; the Jacobs externalities, which instead are associated with the 
diversity of firms and industries within a given region; and the Porter 
externalities, whose argument is that local competition among firms 
concentrated in the same industry favors local development. Along these lines, 
recently different studies empirically tested whether cross-fertilization of ideas, 
and consequently knowledge spillovers contribute regional productivity 
growth because of the technological homogeneity of firms clustered within the 
same industry, or rather because knowledge externalities are mobile across 
sectors and therefore benefit from the knowledge heterogeneity of the firms 
(e.g. Deckle, 2002; Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser, 2002; Rosenthal and Strange, 
2003).      
 
Influential endogenous growth theory models (e.g., Romer, 1986 and 1990; 
Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Jones, 2002) supported the existence of MAR 
externalities, with knowledge externalities benefiting firms within the same 
industry. More importantly, these models claimed knowledge is a quasi-public 
good, but as a matter of fact characterized it as information. Therefore, within 
well-defined geographical and technological spaces, knowledge and ideas are 
inputs that spill free across firms. The accumulation of labor, capital and R&D is   5
the unique requirement for knowledge spillovers and learning from external 
sources to take place. Knowledge spillovers exert positive and unconditional 
effects on output and productivity growth. Firms co-located in the geographical 
and technological space are able to take advantage from knowledge spillovers 
without occurring in any learning or transaction costs.  
 
Clearly, the new growth theory was implemented upon the line of analysis put 
forward by Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), and subsequently developed in the 
methodology by Griliches (1979 and 1992) and Jaffe (1986). In these earlier 
studies knowledge was seen as a public good, and knowledge externalities are a 
direct consequence of well-known characteristics of technological knowledge: 
non-divisibility, non-appropriability, non-rivalry in use, non-excludability. 
Imitators can take advantage from technological knowledge produced by 
innovators without paying any costs. In this vein, Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) highlighted that innovators can retain only a portion of the stream of 
economic benefits that stem from the use of the technological knowledge they 
generated.  
 
So far we have outlined the basic tenets of the traditional analysis of 
technological externalities, where technological knowledge generated by a 
given firm is an unpaid factor that enters the production function of other firms. 
In this analysis, the market place is unable to provide both appropriate 
incentives and effective mechanisms to remunerate for private invention. The   6
implications of such market failures call for public subsidies and public 
intervention in the generation of technological knowledge, and are appreciated 
in an extensive literature. 
 
However, in the last decade, this analytical framework has been challenged by 
the discovery of the costs required for the exploration, identification, 
absorption, recombination and exploitation of knowledge externally available 
to firms.  
 
A growing body of empirical literature shows that the gains from knowledge 
externalities by both users and imitators are not free. Knowledge does not spill 
over spontaneously. Its identification, access and exploitation by third parties 
require some dedicated resources and an array of costs is typically relevant: 
imitation costs (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981), absorption costs 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen, 2003). The 
acquisition of external knowledge requires also qualified interactions with other 
agents (Guiso e Schivardi, 2007). The exploitation of knowledge externalities 
implies the commitment of resources that are necessary to searching, screening, 
understanding, absorbing, purchasing and acquiring knowledge generated by 
other firms. The capability of agents to access external technological knowledge 
depends on the network of relations and common codes of communication. 
These help to reduce information asymmetries, the scope for opportunistic 
behavior and create a context in which reciprocity, trust and generative   7
relationship can be implemented (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Crémer, Garicano 
and Pratt, 2007).  
 
A second line of enquiry has shown that the positive effects of knowledge 
externalities can be challenged by a number of factors. Negative effects and 
increasing costs can characterize agglomeration within geographic and 
technological clusters as a result of reduced appropriability of proprietary 
knowledge (Jaffe, 1986). Congestion problems and negative effects on 
technological learning and innovation can also easily arise due to excess 
proximity and agglomeration and consequently lock-in, inertia, higher 
communication costs, and redundant interaction structures between actors. As 
it is well known the number of communication channels that are necessary to 
interact increase exponentially with the number of agents. For instance, the 
analysis developed by Amiti and Cameron (2007) leads to expect that the wages 
of scientists and talented people are likely to increase with the increase in the 
density of knowledge generating activities. 
 
Not only too little, but also too much proximity can be detrimental to the 
accumulation and creation of technological knowledge and the innovative 
capabilities of the firms (Boschma, 2005). Similarly, the variety of industry and 
technological fields characterizing a given region can threat the dynamics of 
knowledge externalities when the different sectors and technologies are not   8
related each other and instead are distant and diverging (Frenken, Van Oort, 
Verburg, 2007). 
 
In sum, both the learning from external sources and the ‘absorption’ of 
knowledge spillovers, entail specific costs for those firms willing to profit from 
technological interdependencies and qualified interactions with other firms. 
Such costs are likely to increase exponentially with the density of knowledge 
generating activities. 
 
This growing evidence can be framed and elaborated by means of the notion of 
pecuniary externalities and its application to the study of knowledge 
externalities. We therefore revisit and give emphasis to the notion of pecuniary 
externalities as put forward by Scitovsky (1954). Pecuniary externalities consist 
of the indirect interdependences among actors that take place via the price 
system. Pecuniary externalities apply when firms acquire inputs (and sell 
output) at costs (prices) that are lower (higher) than equilibrium levels because 
of specific structural factors. As a consequence pecuniary externalities hold, 
instead of technological externalities (Scitovsky, 1954; Antonelli, 2008a and b).  
 
We apply this notion, well distinct from that of technological externalities, and 
articulate its implications for the analysis of technological knowledge as an 
economic good. This perspective is motivated by the need of accounting for 
both boosting and limiting factors affecting the effects of knowledge   9
externalities. While the former consist of the advantages associated with the 
opportunities each firm has to learn and ‘absorb’ technological knowledge 
generated elsewhere (i.e., other firms, universities, public R&D labs), the latter 
are represented by the additional costs engendered by the set up of the 
networking structure necessary to benefit from external sources of knowledge, 
and not only from in-house R&D investments.  
 
In other words, we put emphasis on the costs firms are facing to access and 
exploit knowledge externalities. In this respect, knowledge cannot be treated as 
information, as it is done in both the public good and the new growth theory 
literature. Therefore, the traditional notion of technological knowledge cannot 
capture the effects of the resources that firms need to allocate in order to 
implement dedicated strategies of external learning, knowledge absorption and 
knowledge interactions. When the specificities of knowledge as an economic 
good are appreciated, externalities cannot be but pecuniary. 
 
The costs of the exploration, absorption, recombination and exploitation of 
knowledge that cannot be fully appropriated by “inventors”, can be 
comprehensively described as the costs of external knowledge. They vary 
according to the characteristics of the system. The density of knowledge 
generating activities has a direct bearing on the levels of the cost of external 
knowledge (Antonelli, 2007 and 2008a).  
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Both the positive and negative effects on pecuniary knowledge externalities 
depend upon the density of innovative agents co-localized in the same region. It 
is clear that the larger is the density of innovative agents and the larger is the 
opportunity to access knowledge spillovers, but is also clear that the larger is 
the density of innovative agents and the larger are the costs of exploitation.  
 
A simple geometrical exposition can help to clarify our analysis (see Figure 1). 
Let us define NNR the net benefits from pecuniary knowledge externalities:  
CKE CEQ NNR − =           ( 1 )  
According to Scitovsky, pecuniary externalities are described as the difference 
between equilibrium cost levels (CEQ) in perfect markets, were knowledge a 
capital good, and the actual costs of external knowledge (CKE). The latter are 
therefore lower than the equilibrium levels as an effect of externalities. Yet, they 
are affected by both the congestion costs (CC) engendered by too a high density 
of innovation agents in the system, and the costs necessary to effectively exploit 
external knowledge (CI): 
) , ( ) ( H N CI N CC CKE + =          ( 2 )  
d[CC(N)]/dN > 0 ; d2[CC(N)]/dN > 0 
d[CI(N,H)]/dN < 0 ; d2[CI(N,H)]/dN < 0 
d[CI(N,H)]/dH < 0 
 
Where N is the number of innovating agents within the system, and H stands 
for the homogeneity of technological activities in the innovation system. 
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Economic systems with different composition of knowledge generating 
activities and different characteristics of their networking structures are also 
characterized by different costs of external knowledge. In particular we assume 
that systems characterized by lower level of technological homogeneity (H) and 
greater variety, also experienced steeper costs curves. In Figure 1, CKE(H1) > 
CKE(H2) and H1 < H2. 
>>> INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE <<< 
As a benchmark we assume that the equilibrium levels of firm’s costs (CEQ) do 
not depend on the number of innovating agents in the system and therefore can 
be represented by a straight line parallel to the horizontal axis, and higher than 
CEK between Nmin and Nmax. This gives rise to the curve of NNR(N) 
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Combining the effects of factors affecting both positively and negatively 
knowledge externalities, from a theoretical viewpoint we are therefore able to 
qualify the relationship between agglomeration and productivity growth as a 
quadratic function. Positive net agglomeration effects are found only until a 
given threshold N*. At N* pecuniary knowledge externalities fetch their 
maximum. Too much agglomeration progressively dissipates the advantages in   12
terms of knowledge externalities due to the increasing costs of external 
knowledge: beyond N* the increasing levels of the negative effects of 
agglomeration on the actual costs of external knowledge become stronger and 
stronger. Beyond Nmax  external knowledge costs more than in equilibrium 
conditions.  
 
At each point in time firms are interested to take advantage of net pecuniary 
knowledge externalities available nearby their present location even if they are 
below the maximum levels available in remote locations because of relevant 
switching costs: firms cannot move freely in space. Hence we expect to identify 
firms after N=N*. Without limitations to mobility, instead, firms would try and 
select the locations where N=N* and abandon locations where N>N*. 
 
Moreover, from our analysis it is clear that net pecuniary knowledge 
externalities should be higher in contexts characterized by greater technological 
homogeneity. The greater is the homogeneity of technological specialization, 
the greater and more persistent are also the positive effects of knowledge 
externalities. On the contrary, the greater is the variety of the technological base 
of the region, the more rapidly negative effects take place. In Figure 1, NNR(H2) 
> NNR(H1). 
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3  The evidence of pecuniary knowledge externalities 
3.1  Methodology 
 
This section provides the basic methodology to investigate the relationship 
between the net effects of pecuniary knowledge externalities and the 
agglomeration of technological activities. Knowledge externalities, lowering 
production costs of firms able to access them, are likely to affect the dynamics of 
productivity growth. Indeed, firms will experience a shift in their production 
function, increasing output without changing the scale of production factors. 
 
Therefore, in order to the estimate the effects of knowledge externalities we first 
need to measure total factor productivity (TFP), Ait, following the growth 
accounting approach (Solow, 1957; Jorgenson, 1995; OECD, 2001). Let us start 
by assuming that the regional economy can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function with constant returns to scale: 
it it
it it it it L K A Y
β β − =
1           ( 2 )  
where Lit is the total hours worked in the region i at the time t, Kit is the level of 
the capital stock in the region i at the time t, and Ait is the level of TFP in the 
region i at the time t. 
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The yearly output elastiticity of labour, βit, is calculated for each region as the 
total income share of employment compensation2. Then the annual growth rate 
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Our basic hypothesis is that the positive effects of knowledge externalities 
dominate until a critical mass of agents within the system is reached. The 
further increase in the density of agents makes the networking and congestion 
costs grow more than the positive effects stemming from knowledge spillovers. 
Negative externalities are in turn mitigated by the positive effects played by the 
increasing homogeneity of technological activities within the area. 
 
The test of such hypothesis needs for modelling the growth rate of TFP as a 
function of the density of technological activities, which we call Dit, and of an 
index of technological homogeneity of regions, which we call Hit. Moreover, it is 
usual in this kind of empirical settings to include the lagged value of TFP, 
1 , ln − t i A , in order to capture the possibility of mean reversion. In general terms, 
this relationship can be written as follows: 
) , , (ln
) 1 (
) (
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2 In the discrete approximation of the Divisia index, the growth rate of the production factor is 
weighted by the two years average of the output elasticity. Therefore, in Equation (3) β  is the 
two years average output elasticity of labour.   15
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Where  D* is the threshold level of the density of technological activities. A 
convenient way to represent such a kind of relationship can be found in the 
following structural equation: 
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Where the error term is decomposed in ρi and Σψt, which are respectively 
region and time effects, and the error component εit. Equation (5) proposes on 
the one hand a linear relationship between TFP growth and technological 
homogeneity according to which we expect d > 0. On the other hand it specifies 
a quadratic relationship between TFP growth and density, where we expect 
c1>0 and c2<0. 
 
3.2  The data 
 
In order to investigate the relationships between economic performances on the 
one hand, and the density and homogeneity of innovation activities on the 
other hand, the data were mainly drawn from the Eurostat regional statistics, 
obtaining an unbalanced panel of 138 European regions, observed in the time 
span ranging from 1995 to 2003. 
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As far as TFP is concerned, we need output, labour and capital services, and the 
labour and capital shares. As a measure of output we used the real GDP (2000 
constant prices). Eurostat also provides with estimation of capital stock and 
employment, although it does not provide data about hours worked at the 
regional level. For this reason we used average hours worked at the country 
level provided by the Groningen Growth and Development Centre3, and then 
calculate total hours worked. Although this does not allow us to appreciate 
cross-regional difference in average hours worked, nonetheless it allows us to 
account at least for cross-country differences. The labour share is calculated 
using data on the compensation of employees and the GDP, while capital share 
is calculated as 1 minus labour share. 
 
As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, we need a measure of 
innovation activity. To this purpose we used the number of patent applications 
submitted to the European Patent Office (EPO), provided by the Eurostat 
regional science and technology indicators. Patent applications are assigned to 
regions according to inventor’s address. Moreover each patent is assigned to 
one or more technological classes, according to the international patent 
classification (IPC) 4. 
                                                 
3 www.ggdc.net. 
4  Patent applications as economic indicators present well-known drawbacks. They can be 
summarized in their sector-specificity, the existence of non patentable innovations and the fact 
that they are not the only protecting tool. Moreover the propensity to patent tends to vary over 
time as a function of the cost of patenting, and it is more likely to feature large firms (Pavitt, 
1985; Levin et al., 1987; Griliches, 1990). However, previous studies highlighted the usefulness 
of patents as measures of production of new knowledge, above all in the context of analyses of 
innovation performances at the aggregate regional level (Acs et al., 2002).   17
 
For the density of technological activity, D, we take the ratio between the 
regional levels of patent applications5 and the regional level of employment. We 
therefore assume that knowledge externalities arise within regional areas, and 
that negative effects arise when the density of innovating agents within the 





D = ,  
For the index of homogeneity, we calculated technological specialization of 
regions by using the Hirschman-Herfindal index (HHI). In particular, the IPC 
classification is organized at different levels of aggregation. We decided to take 
the one digit classification, so that eight classes can be distinguished, ranging 
from A to H. Therefore for each region at each year we were able to calculate 









t j i t i s HHI  
Where  sijt is the share of technological class j in the overall set of patent 
applications at time t in region i. The higher (lower) the index, the higher 
(lower) the technological homogeneity of regions. 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the key variables, reporting the 
within and between values for the 138 regions considered in our analysis. This 
                                                                                                                                               
  
5 Due to the high variance of patenting activity over time, we decided to calculate the 5-years 
moving average at each year.   18
preliminary data reveal that the variables are characterized by a fairly 
significant degree of variance, both within and between regions. On average, 
the cross-regional dispersion is higher than that observed within regions over 
time. Moreover, the dispersion of the density index within regions is higher 
than that of the homogeneity index, while the reverse applies for what concerns 
the cross-regional variance. 
>>> INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE <<< 
To gain a better understanding of cross-regional differences in our sample, in 
Figure 2 we report the maps that assign the regions to the percentiles of the 
distribution of patent applications6. Such diagrams provide some interesting 
preliminary information. Fist of all, the 1996 evidence about France shows that 
all the French regions are below the 90th percentile. Germany contains most of 
the highest-level patenting regions. However, there is only one region above the 
99th percentile, i.e. Rheinhessen, while the other regions in Bavaria and Baden-
Württemberg are between the 90th and the 99th percentile. Three further 
regions appear in the uppermost group, i.e. the Noord-Brabant in the 
Netherlands and Oxfordshire and the East Anglia in the UK. Northern-Italy 
regions and the Abruzzi are below the 90th percentile, while the rest of Italy 
falls in the penultimate group. It is also fair to note that Northern-Finland and 
the Swedish regions of Mellansverige and Sydsverige moved upward in the 
second group. In 2003 some significant changes can be found. In particular, in 
                                                 
6 A percentile is the value of a variable below which a certain percent of observations fall. So the 20th 
percentile is the value (or score) below which 20 percent of the observations may be found. The 25th 
percentile is also known as the first quartile; the 50th percentile as the median.   19
Germany the Rheinhessen lost its position, while Stuttgart and Freiburg are in 
the first group, along with the Noord-Brabant. All other regions within the 
Bavaria, the Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia states are in the 
second group of regions, along with Herefordshire and East Anglia. It is quite 
interesting to note that the Oxfordshire moved downward to the third group. 
Moreover, most of Finnish regions are between the 90th and 99th percentile. 
>> FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE << 
This descriptive evidence shows that there is a significant variance across 
European regions for all variables. High levels of agglomerations seem to 
feature mostly some areas of the UK and Germany, along with some Swedish 
regions. Moreover, the density of innovating agents appears to vary to a great 
extent also over time, within the observed regional contexts. For this reason in 
what follows we will use panel data techniques in the econometric test.  
 
3.3  Econometric results 
 
In the empirical analysis we estimate the shape and the extent of positive 
feedbacks stemming from the agglomeration of innovation activities and the 
specialization of technological activity.  
 
Table 2 shows the results of the econometric estimation of Equation (5). The first 
two columns propose a baseline model analyzing the effects of spatial 
agglomeration of innovation activity. In the linear specification, the coefficient 
for the density of patents is positive and significant, providing support to the   20
idea that the agglomeration of innovating agents leads to productivity gains. In 
the second column we better qualify this relationship by introducing the 
quadratic specification. The estimates provide support to the idea that positive 
knowledge externalities apply only to a limited extent. Once a critical level of 
agents is reached in the system, search costs start growing more than 
proportionally. This is due to the increasing number of knowledge sources that 
need to be screened and push innovating agents to raise the amount of 
resources committed to the establishment and management of new 
communication channels. 
 
In Models 3 to 5 we include the HHI accounting for the changes in the 
composition of the regional knowledge base. Let us recall that the higher the 
value of the index, the more homogeneous the technological activities within 
the region. Model 3 combines the linear specification for both the agglomeration 
and the specialization indicators. The coefficient for the two variables are 
positive and significant. This confirms the evidence about the positive effects 
from agglomeration, and provides supports for the idea that increasing 
technological specialization exerts boosting effects on productivity. Increasing 
homogeneity in the knowledge base is indeed likely to lower search costs, as 
long as it makes it easier for innovating agents to identify, access and absorb 
relevant technological knowledge available in the system. 
>>> INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE <<<   21
In Model 4 the linear specification for the HHI is combined with the quadratic 
specification for the density index. The results appear to be fairly persistent. On 
the one hand, the coefficients for the density are indeed statistically significant, 
and indicate the existence of an inverted U-relationship between the 
agglomeration of innovation activities and productivity growth. On the other 
hand the coefficient for the homogeneity index is again positive and significant. 
This amounts to say that advantages stemming from increasing technological 
specialization are likely to mitigate the effects of negative externalities 
stemming from too much agglomeration. Although the increase in the number 
of innovating agents engenders the rise of search costs, the convergence 
towards a core technological specialization enhances absorptive capacity and 
hence lowers absorption costs. Finally, to check the results in Model 5  we 
combine the quadratic specification for both the density and the homogeneity 
index. The outcome is basically the same as the previous model, as the 
quadratic term on HHI is not statistically significant, while the sign and 
significance on the other variables are fairly similar. 
 
4  Conclusions 
 
Building upon the notion of pecuniary knowledge externalities, as distinct from 
technological externalities, we have been able to specify a quadratic relationship 
between the concentration of innovative activities at the regional level and their 
net positive effects. We were able to qualify the relationship between 
knowledge externalities and agglomeration as a quadratic function.   22
Agglomeration yields positive net knowledge externalities only until a given 
threshold. Too much agglomeration progressively dissipates the advantages in 
terms of knowledge externalities due to the increasing costs of the actual 
assimilation and recombination of external knowledge.  
 
The paper has provided a strong test for the hypotheses that a quadratic 
relationship takes place between technological concentration and total factor 
productivity growth for 138 European regions, in the time span ranging from 
1995 to 2003.  
 
The quadratic specification is a powerful result because it enables to identify the 
shifting relative advantage of regions in the location of knowledge generating 
activities.  
 
The identification of the notion of relative advantage in the location of 
knowledge generating activities enables to identify the regions where it is not 
appropriate to invest in knowledge generating activities, the regions where it is 
‘more’ convenient to invest in knowledge generating activities, and the regions 
where it would be better to reduce the levels of knowledge generating activities.  
 
The strong econometric results enable to appreciate the implications of the 
quadratic specification in terms of output elasticity to additional knowledge 
generating activities. It is clear in fact that by definition in a quadratic function   23
the second derivative is stronger the smaller the level of the concentration. 
Hence the paper suggests that the output elasticity of additional research 
activities is higher in peripheral rather than in core regions. 
 
Moreover, we find evidence that the positive effect of knowledge externalities 
on productivity growth are stronger where there high levels of specialization in 
homogeneous technological fields. Regions where knowledge generating 
activities insist in a limited scope benefit from agglomeration more than regions 
where the composition is less homogeneous and more diversified. Our evidence 
suggests, in other words, that Jacobs pecuniary externalities apply only in a 
limited range of knowledge fields. 
 
At a more practical level the quadratic specification and the results of the 
estimates according to which the maximum is well within the actual data, is a 
powerful and quite innovative tool to articulate the view that the dissemination 
of research activities may yield better results than their concentration. The 
implications for both innovation and regional policy in fact are relevant. First, it 
is not efficient to create excessive agglomeration of knowledge generating 
activities within a given region: beyond the threshold negative effects of 
agglomeration begin to take place. Second and most important, it is also clear 
that all investments in knowledge generating activities are much more 
profitable, at the margin, in regions with lower level of agglomeration. Third, 
the specialization of knowledge generating activities reduces the costs of   24
external knowledge and favors the increase of the optimum size of clusters. 
Innovation and regional policy willing to exploit the positive effects of 
knowledge externalities stemming from the concentration of technological 
activities should design appropriate investment incentives to: I) favor the 
dissemination of knowledge generating activities in regions with low levels of 
concentration in knowledge generating activities II) prevent their excess 
concentration in a few spots and III) increase the specialization of regions 
within well identified knowledge fields.  
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables 
 Mean  St.  Deviation  Min  Max 
   Within  Between     
Growth rate of TFP 
(log differences) 
0.025 0.023  0.033  -0.048  0.151 
Growth rate of capital 
(log differences) 
0.021 0.078  0.067  -0.422  0.369 
Growth rate of labour 
(log differences) 
0.009 0.015  0.009  -0.083  0.108 
Patents per  
million employees 
2445.5 594.9  2197.4  16.71  17681.2 
Technological 
homogeneity 
0.234 0.064  0.087  0.138 0.99 
   30
 
Table 2 - Region TFP growth, panel data fixed effects estimates 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 





















1 − t D    -1.68·10-9 *** 
(5.08·10-10) 











1 − t HHI        -0.034 
(0.031) 
       
       
R2  0.25 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.27 
Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.0.01. Standard errors between parentheses. All regressions include time dummies. 
 
 